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Software safety is an important characteristic, which indicates the probability of correct program operation 
under different operating conditions. However, embedded software developers do not always focus on this 
aspect, especially in critical systems. The present article discusses the international software security 
standards and certificates. The author studies the source code of the presently discontinued electrosurgical 
device EHVCh-80 by NPO «NIKOR» and analyzes the issues of validity of choosing the programming 
language and architecture. The paper provides the algorithm of the program’s operation and describes the 
main tasks performed by the microcontroller. In conclusion, the author uses the results of this software’s 
analysis to offer recommendations to simplify software support and possible options to reduce errors, both in 
the code and in the architecture of the developed application. The results of this research allow to increase 
software safety, especially in critical systems. 
With improvement of control systems in embedded designs, especially in systems that are critical to safety, it 
is necessary to ensure the safety and reliability of the designed software. Designers should understand that 
not only hardware failure (electrical, mechanical, etc.) in a medical device can cause the danger to the 
patient. Software bugs can also cause serious problems. 
There is a number of international standards and security certificates, for example MISRA C [1] or Safety 
Integrity Level [2]. When using these standards, the safety analysis lies in reducing a potential source of 
harm and decreasing it to the minimum. It is necessary to consider all steps of device development, from 
inception to decommissioning. 
SIL (Safety Integrity Level) certification addresses system level reliability.  Major accidents such as the 
Bhopal disaster (1984), the Piper Alpha oil rig disaster in the North Sea (1988) and others, have led to the 
creation of this certification. During the investigation of these events, demands were made by government 
agencies to check the systems responsible for safety. This led to the development of the international 
standards ISA S84 [3] and IEC 61508/61511[4] that in turn formed the basis of Russian standards such as 
GOST R IEC 61508-1-2007 [5]. The value of the level of reliability depends on whether the system will be 
subjected to more or less stringent requirements. 
The MISRA standard is a set of requirements (rules) for software development in the C language in addition 
to the standard rules. 
Both higher-order language and assembler language have their advantages in writing programs for 
microcontrollers. The main advantage of assembler is fast performance and small code size. On the other 
hand, there are disadvantages of poor readability and difficulties in maintenance. This adds additional 
constraints if it is necessary to add new features or change the structure of the program. If used incorrectly, a 
command to the microcontroller can change data and cause undesired operation of a device. Rigid 
attachment of a language to a specific platform makes it impossible to perform automatic analysis of code 
for security. 
The reasons for the C language’s popularity in embedded systems are simple. The language is standardized, 
and its constructs are easily associated with machine instructions. The code becomes independent of the 
microcontroller and it is possible to transfer the program to different platforms. 
In addition to syntax errors, there are other problems where the ISO C standard [6] specifies that the 
implementation may be certain or uncertain. Beginners face difficulties applying this programming 
language. The solution is to limit the use of some of the language’s functions with well-defined opportunities 
to enhance application performance. To solve these problems, the Motor Industry Software Reliability 
Association (MISRA) has produced a range of mandatory, required and recommended programming 
practices [1]. 
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